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Today, financial investors have been especially attuned to interest rate risks and profitability in the international financial system, in the same way that transnational banks owned Latin American sovereign debt years before. An explanation of the structural crisis in the Eurozone implies an understanding of the financial and monetary agreements laid out in the Maastricht Treaty and the position of the Central Bank with regard to financial markets. A heterodox perspective is necessary to understand this long process of economic deterioration and discern the global fragility of the current financial system. The objective of this article is to analyze financialization in the current economic and financial crisis in Europe as well as its role in the Latin American debt crisis. The recurrent crises from the 1970s up to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy are manifestations of the financialization process and relate to its different facets.

Europe is experiencing a “déjà vu” history through which Latin America has already lived. The scope of the current European crisis calls for a rereading of mainstream economic theory.

Deja vu history